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This paper provides the first detailed empirical study on the use of prepayments by firms.
Our results based on large panels of French firms support the Daripa and Nilsen (2011)
production subsidy theory of prepayment, according to which customers prepay their
suppliers when these would otherwise delay production and input supply. However, we
also find that advance cash payments may arise as a response to corporate default risk.
Our findings show that both firm characteristics (profitability, liquidity, bank funding,
and size) and industry characteristics such as the type of traded goods and industry
concentration measures influence the volume of prepayments.
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Introduction
A vast literature provides both theoretical explanations and empirical evidence on the
reasons why firms use trade credit (delayed payment for the transfer of goods to the
downstream firm). However, the reasons why firms advance liquid cash to their suppliers
have been the object of little scrutiny. Only recently, Daripa and Nilsen (2011) have provided
a theoretical model of prepayment showing that downstream firms may optimally decide to
advance liquid cash to their upstream suppliers when the latter would otherwise delay
production.
1 On the empirical side, a handful of works have linked the use of prepayments to
customer default risk or with the high risks associated with international trade. In the context
of transition economies, Raiser et al. (2008) use the level of prepayment as a measure of
business trust, arguing that supplier firms demand advance payment from their perceived
high default risk customers. Antras and Foley (2011) provide evidence that importers located
in a country with weak contractual enforcement or in a country that is further from the
exporter’s country are more likely to be required cash advance payments. This paper
conducts the first thorough empirical investigation of the determinants of prepayments. It
jointly tests the production continuation hypothesis in Daripa and Nilsen (2011) and the
hypothesis that prepayment arises as a solution to firm default risk.
As prepayment can be seen as reverse trade credit, our paper is related to several
empirical studies analysing trade credit. Our empirical modelling strategy is close to the one
in Mateut et al. (2011), but we focus on prepayments (transfers of liquid cash to the upstream
input provider) as opposed to trade credit (delayed payment on the transfer of inputs to
downstream firms). We expect prepayments to suppliers, just like sales on credit, to be
correlated with firms’ stocks of inventories as predicted by the theoretical model in Daripa
and Nilsen (2011). We use the same source of data as Mateut et al. (2011), the Diane dataset
provided by Bureau van Dijk. Our large panel dataset of French manufacturing and
construction firms records about 300,000 observations over the period 1999-2007. We have
detailed balance sheet information, including customer prepayments (received by upstream
firms) and prepayments to suppliers (paid by downstream firms). Our rich dataset allows us
also to distinguish inventories at different stages of fabrication and to test whether
prepayments, just like trade credit, are correlated with the degree of differentiation of the
1 Similarly, their model explains the use of trade credit as an upstream firm optimal strategy to induce the
downstream firm not to delay production.3
traded goods. This way we relate our work with the study by Giannetti et al. (2011), which
shows that trade credit extension is correlated with the characteristics of the traded goods.
We start our analysis from the point of view of the upstream firm and look at the
relationship between prepayments received and suppliers’ stocks of inventories, the types of
goods produced and other firm level characteristics such as profitability, liquidity, risk, and
size. We then take the viewpoint of a downstream firm and explain prepayments to suppliers
with the types of inputs used by the firm by controlling for the proportion of differentiated,
standardized and service inputs in an approach similar to Giannetti et al. (2011) and Mateut et
al. (2011). A number of key results emerge from our analysis.
First, the use of prepayments is associated with higher stocks of inventories both for
subsidized upstream firms and for downstream firms aiming to keep the production chain
going. Downstream firms keen to meet their uncertain final demand prepay their upstream
suppliers inducing them to produce. At the same time, they also start their own production
process and increase their own stocks of inventories in an attempt to avoid being caught out
of stocks when a customer arrives.
2
Second, customer prepayments are more frequent and larger as a share of total sales in
the differentiated goods and in the construction sector than in the standardized manufacturing
sector. These findings provide evidence supporting the prediction of Daripa and Nilsen (2011)
that customers will subsidize production and inventory storage of their suppliers of
specialized inputs. The results also support the diversion theory in Burkart and Ellingsen
(2004) and are in line with the findings in Giannetti et al. (2011) that trade credit extended is
correlated with the characteristics of the traded goods.
Third, higher profit margin in the downstream market leads to larger amounts of
liquidity being transferred to upstream suppliers. Similarly, higher industry concentration in
the downstream market, which could proxy higher downstream profits, is correlated with
larger prepayments to suppliers. This finding supports the prediction in Daripa and Nilsen
(2011) that high downstream incentive in immediate production leads to cash advances to
upstream suppliers.
Finally, our results suggest that prepayments arise as a solution not only when the
upstream firm considers delaying production but also in cases of firm default risk. We find
that riskier suppliers are offered less advance payments relative to sales than suppliers with
2 This is in line with the stock-out avoidance motive for holding inventories. Sales uncertainty and increased
stock-out risk may lead to an increase in the level of inventories. See for instance, Lee and Koray (1994), Bo
(2001), and Caglayan et al. (2011).4
lower default risk. This means customers are only willing to make prepayments if they trust
their suppliers. At the same time, suppliers will demand their newer customers to make larger
payments in advance.
To summarize, the stronger the incentives of the downstream firms to ensure
continued production, the larger the volume of prepayments to their upstream suppliers of
specialized inputs. These results are robust to the choice of estimator and provide support
both to the production subsidy theory in Daripa and Nilsen (2011) and to the default risk
hypothesis tested by a small empirical literature (Raiser et al., 2008, Antras and Foley, 2011).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
background and the hypotheses we are testing. Section 3 describes the data and summary
statistics. Section 4 presents the model and the methodology used. In Section 5, we present
our empirical findings and in the final section we conclude.
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses
Many of the theoretical hypotheses tested in this paper are drawn from the model by
Daripa and Nilsen (2011). In their model, an upstream firm produces an intermediate good
which a downstream firm uses as input, and converts into a final consumption good. There
are an infinite number of periods. Each firm requires exactly one period of time to produce
one unit. The downstream firm has the capacity to hold one unit of final good in inventory.
The demand for the final consumption good is stochastic. If the downstream firm holds the
final good in inventory and a customer arrives, a successful sale occurs. If the downstream
firm does not stock the final good, the customer may return the following period but will not
return after two periods.
Both firms can choose between immediate production and delayed production for one
or more periods. If both firms follow an immediate production strategy a sale occurs at the
arrival of a final customer. If both firms follow a “wait-and-see” strategy, production never
gets started as it takes two periods to produce the final good and a non-satisfied customer
does not return after two periods. If non-production is optimal for one of the firms, a negative
externality arises. If the downstream firm finds it profitable to follow a waiting strategy, it
might lose some sales, generating a negative externality for the upstream firm. By selling on
trade credit (delayed payment), the upstream firm subsidizes the downstream firm’s inventory
holding and induces it to internalize the externality. Similarly, reverse trade credit, i.e.
prepayment, arises whenever the upstream firm wants to wait, generating a negative5
externality for the downstream firm. Therefore, the downstream firm prepays (part of) inputs
giving the upstream firm an incentive to start production and deliver the inputs.
The paper leads to several similar empirical predictions for trade credit extended and
prepayments to suppliers. Empirical evidence supporting the predictions regarding trade
credit can be found in the existing literature (e.g. Giannetti et al., 2011, and Mateut et al.,
2011). Therefore, in this paper, we focus only on prepayment. The rest of this section
develops the theoretical hypotheses we will test in the empirical analysis.
Prepayment arises whenever the downstream firm needs to offer the upstream
supplier an incentive to continue production. On receipt of advance payment, upstream firms
will start their production processes and therefore increase their stocks of inventories.
Interestingly, we would also expect to find a positive correlation between prepayments to
suppliers and downstream firms’ inventories. Downstream firms with better credit terms are
willing to prepay their suppliers and also hold stocks of inventories as they have a strong
incentive to meet their uncertain demand.
Hypothesis 1 (Prepayments and inventory stocks): Customer prepayments are
positively correlated with the upstream firms’ inventories. Prepayments to suppliers and
downstream firms’ inventories are also positively correlated.
In the context of trade credit, Giannetti et al. (2011) and Fabbri and Menichini (2010)
build on the diversion theory in Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) and link the use of trade credit
with the characteristics of the transacted good or service. As a product becomes more
specialized in nature, it has fewer alternative uses and fewer suppliers, and this ensures that
the relationship between customer and supplier becomes stronger. Therefore, producers of
differentiated goods are more likely to sell on credit than producers of standardized goods.
However, if upstream producers consider delaying production as in Daripa and Nilsen (2011),
companies requiring specialized inputs will prepay their suppliers of differentiated goods or
services with a long cycle of production to give them an incentive to continue production. As
a consequence, prepayments should also be correlated with the characteristics of the traded
goods.
Hypothesis 2 (Prepayments and goods characteristics): Upstream firms producing
differentiated goods or services with a long cycle of production receive higher customer
prepayments than producers of standardized goods. Downstream firms’ prepayments to their
suppliers increase with the proportion of specific inputs used in their production.
Using financial rationing arguments, many theoretical models suggest a positive
relationship between sales on credit (trade credit extended) and bank loans (e.g. Burkart and6
Ellingsen, 2004, Bougheas et al., 2009). Starting with Petersen and Rajan (1997), the
empirical literature has shown that the availability of finance is an important consideration in
determining whether suppliers extend trade credit. Similarly, trade credit received has been
shown to be negatively correlated with the availability of bank loans. In Daripa and Nilsen
(2011), there is no credit rationing but upstream and downstream firms face different credit
terms from outside lenders. Better credit terms in the upstream market will lead to sales on
credit and conversely, better credit terms in the downstream market will result in prepayment.
Focusing on prepayments, the receipt of advance payment from their customers could reduce
the need of upstream firms to use bank loans. At the same time, downstream firms have to
use their internal funds and may need more external funding in order to prepay their input
suppliers. Being a transfer of liquid cash to the upstream firm, prepayments should have a
contrasting impact on the liquidity of the upstream and of the downstream firm.
Hypothesis 3 (Prepayments and bank loans): Customer prepayments are negatively
correlated with the upstream firms’ use of bank loans. The opposite holds for downstream
firms.
Hypothesis 4 (Prepayments and liquidity): Customer prepayments are positively
correlated with the upstream firms’ liquidity. The reverse effects hold for downstream firms.
As their profit margin increases, downstream firms have a higher incentive to prepay
their suppliers and ensure continued production. At the same time, we would expect lower
profitability upstream firms to receive more prepayments from their customers. When
customer-seller relationships are strong, buyers facing better credit terms help out their less
profitable suppliers. In a similar vein, Giannetti et al. (2011) and Petersen and Rajan (1997)
use survey data to find that suppliers are more likely to deny trade credit to their more
profitable customers, which are also less likely to offer trade credit.
Hypothesis 5 (Prepayments and profit margin): Prepayments to suppliers increase
with the profit margin in the downstream market. Low profitability upstream firms receive
more customer prepayments.
Customer-seller relationships may be influenced by industry characteristics such as
the industry concentration in the product market. If industry concentration proxies the degree
of competition in the product market, it can also provide a measure of firm profitability. Thus,
most literature postulates a positive relationship between industry concentration and firm
profitability. In the model of Daripa and Nilsen (2011), the probability that the final customer
arrives could be linked to industry concentration. In a more concentrated industry, the
probability that the final customer arrives should be higher. This implies that the downstream7
firm’s incentive to hold goods on stock in order to meet final demand is higher. We then
expect to find a positive correlation between downstream market concentration and
prepayments to suppliers. Looking at the upstream market now, an input supplier in a more
concentrated industry has a lower incentive to delay production and therefore it is less likely
to receive prepayments from its downstream buyer. Hypothesis 6 presents the expected
relationship between industry concentration and prepayments.
Hypothesis 6 (Prepayments and industry concentration): Lower upstream market
concentration is correlated with higher customer prepayments. Prepayments to suppliers
increase with the industry concentration in the downstream market.
A small empirical literature suggests that prepayment is used, mainly in developing
countries, as a response to default risk. Raiser et al. (2008) use a large survey of firms across
26 transition economies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and measure the
extent of trust in business relationships with the level of prepayment. In their paper, a higher
level of prepayment demanded by firms indicates a lower level of trust in their customers. At
the same time, Antras and Foley (2011) find that cash advance payments are more likely to
be required when importers are located in a country with weak contractual enforcement or in
a country that is further from the exporter’s country.
3 On the supply side (downstream
market), both in developing economies and in the context of international trade, customers
should only be willing to make prepayments if they trust their suppliers will not default.
Hypothesis 7 (Prepayments and default risk): Suppliers with lower default risk receive
larger customer prepayments (upstream market). Prepayments to suppliers increase with the
extent of customer default risk (downstream market).
The following section describes the data we will use to test our empirical hypotheses.
3. Data and summary statistics
The main data source used in this study is gathered by Bureau Van Dijk Electronic
Publishing in the DIANE database, which provides a nationally representative sample of
financial information about French companies. The vast majority of the firms in our sample
are not quoted on the stock exchange. The firm level data from Diane is complemented with
industry level information extracted from the input-output tables available from INSEAD.
According to Daripa and Nilsen (2011), their theory suits best manufacturing and service
3 Antras and Foley (2011) show that a US based exporter of frozen and refrigerated food products was more
likely to demand cash in advance terms when trading with new customers.8
industries requiring a long production process, such as construction.
4 Therefore, our sample
includes firms operating in manufacturing and construction industries.
The database provides detailed industry specific information that allows us to identify
the characteristics of the traded products. In line with Giannetti et al. (2011) and Mateut et al.
(2011) we separate manufacturing firms into differentiated and standardized. The matching of
industry codes to the two sectors can be found in the appendix. The largest single sector in
our database is construction, which comprises roughly 46% of our total observations, and the
manufacturing sector is made up of differentiated (34%) and standardized (20%) firms, as
recorded in Table 1. Firms with less than three consecutive yearly observations and the one
percent tails for each of the regression variables are dropped to control for the potential
influence of outliers. The final sample includes about 300,000 observations for
manufacturing and construction firms observed over the period 1999-2007. Panel B of Table
1 presents the structure of the whole panel and separately by sectors.
<Table 1 about here>
Inter-firm payments are generally complex and bi-directional as firms are often in the
middle of a credit chain. On the one hand, there is delayed payment for the shipment of goods
to downstream firms. Firms sell on credit to their downstream customers, but they also
receive trade credit from their suppliers. This is trade credit (extended and received), which
has been the object of study of numerous works. On the other hand, downstream firms
advance liquid cash to their upstream suppliers. Firms both receive advance payments from
their downstream customers and also prepay their suppliers. Prepayment has not been
thoroughly studied before and we aim to fill this gap in the literature.
Table 2 shows that, on average, about 28% of the firms in our sample receive
prepayments from their customers. The percentage is higher for construction firms (33%) and
for firms producing differentiated manufacturing goods (28%) than for firms producing
standardized manufacturing goods (17%). This provides some first evidence for our
hypothesis that prepayments are correlated with the characteristics of the traded goods.
Producers of differentiated goods and of services with a long production cycle are likely to
receive higher prepayments from their customers whose production depend on these
specialized inputs. Prepayments received as a fraction of total sales are higher in the
differentiated goods and in the construction sectors than in the standardized goods sector.
4 See Daripa and Nilsen (2011) p.248-2499
Customer prepayments represent, however, a small proportion of the average upstream firms’
total sales (less than 1%).
<Table 2 about here>
The bottom half of the table gives details from the downstream firm’s viewpoint. A
large proportion of the firms in our sample (72%) do not make prepayments to their suppliers.
By contrast to customer prepayments, prepayments to suppliers do not differ much across
manufacturing sectors and are lowest in the case of construction firms. This is not unusual as
prepayments to suppliers depend on the characteristics of the inputs used, i.e. the proportion
of differentiated versus standardized and service inputs.
Note that the recorded customer prepayments figures are the result of the equilibrium
between the customers’ offer to prepay and the sellers’ demand for (partial) payment before
delivery. Prepayments to suppliers are similarly a combination of supply and demand factors.
While the demand and supply may vary across individual firms, the size of our sample means
that we have a large enough number of observations within each sector for idiosyncratic
effects to have little impact on the sector averages. Any systematic differences between
sectors will later be picked up by industry dummies.
Summary statistics for the main control variables used in this study are presented in
Table 3 Panel A for the whole sample and also separately for each industrial sector. Panels
3B and 3C report correlation coefficients separately for the upstream and the downstream
market. Standardized goods manufacturers are larger on the basis of real assets and older
compared to differentiated goods manufacturers and construction firms. Standard deviations
within the sub-samples are large suggesting that there is a mixture of smaller and larger firms
of different ages in each sector. Standardized goods manufacturers have a higher ratio of
bank loans to turnover. Stocks and stocks excluding raw materials show that the construction
sector has lower inventories than other sectors, while manufacturers of all types of products
have very similar levels of stocks.
<Table 3 about here>
Other characteristics of the firms reported are profitability, liquidity, and a measure of
risk. Profitability is measured as profit over turnover, and liquidity as cash and bank deposits
over turnover. The risk measure takes ten values, with higher values indicating a higher
likelihood of corporate failure in the next 12 months. The factors that contribute to the risk
score include operating cash flow excluding extraordinary items, interest, dividends and
royalties divided by total debt, long term capital over total assets, current assets and cash over
total assets, interest expenses over turnover, and personnel expenses over value added. The10
details of the aggregation procedure are reported in the appendix. The aggregated risk score is
then translated into a probability of default measure on a ten point scale representing deciles
of the risk distribution. Manufacturers of standardized goods have lower profitability and
liquidity than other sectors. The probability of default implied by the average risk measures is
slightly higher for producers of standardized goods.
4. Empirical model and methodology
Our empirical investigation starts with the analysis of customer prepayments received
by upstream firms. We follow the empirical model in Mateut et al. (2011) to test the
hypotheses described above but we focus on prepayments rather than on trade credit. The
model is as follows:
CustomersPrepayit = αi + β1Stocksit + β2BankLoansit + β3Liquidityit + β4Profitsit + β5Risk +
+ β6Sizeit+ β7Differentiatedi+ β8Constructioni +dt+ uit (1)
where CustomersPrepayit is prepayments received from downstream customers; αi is a firm-
specific component, β's are coefficient values, and uit is the idiosyncratic error component.
We explain customer prepayments with the total stock of inventories (Stocksit); the amount of
bank loans (BankLoansit); Liquidityit represents firm's gross liquid assets (cash and bank
deposits) and Profitsit gives the firm's profit (or loss) for the period. Riskit is a measure of the
likelihood of company failure in the near future. With the exception of Riskit, all variables are
scaled by total sales. Finally, we include the logarithm of firms' book value of assets to
control for size effects (Sizeit). Briefly, stocks measure the incentives firms face to increase
production when receiving prepayments from their customers; bank loans control for external
sources of finance that might allow firms to continue production; measures of risk, profit, and
liquid assets indicate the financial condition of the firm, and size indicates the effect of scale
of the firm on prepayments received from customers. We control for firm-specific (αi), time-
invariant (dt) and sector specific effects (Differentiatedi and Constructioni).
We then model prepayments to suppliers from the downstream firm’s perspective by
estimating the empirical model below:
PrepaySuppliersit = αi + β1Stocksit + β2BankLoansit + β3Liquidityit + β4Profitsit + β5Risk +
+ β6Sizeit+ β7Pdiffit+ β8Pservit +dt+ uit (2)11
where the variables are similarly defined to the previous model but they are now scaled by
firm’s total assets instead of turnover. PrepaySuppliersit is prepayments to suppliers and
Pdiffit is the proportion of differentiated goods inputs used by the firm, and Pservit the
proportion of service inputs used by the firm (defined as inputs from non-manufacturing
industries over total inputs). In line with Giannetti et al. (2011), we control for the proportion
of specialized inputs firms use in their production. If upstream firms have the option to delay
production as in Daripa and Nilsen (2011), we expect downstream firms to make larger
prepayments to their suppliers the larger the proportion of differentiated and service inputs
used in their production processes.
In both equations (1) and (2), we experiment with replacing the variable Stocks with a
measure of inventories at different stages of fabrication. Our hypothesis is that receiving
prepayment from their buyers will induce upstream firms to start their production and hold
larger stocks of work in progress and finished goods (Wifs), i.e. inventories close to final
stages of production that will soon become the input in the downstream market. Excluding
raw materials from total stocks gives us a measure of inventories that matches better the
characteristics of the final traded goods by the upstream firms. Similarly, we replace the total
stock of inventories in the downstream market specification with the stock of basic materials
purchased from other firms to be used in the firm's production operations (Raws).
Downstream firms with better credit terms prepay their input suppliers and are also willing to
hold larger stocks of inputs to be used in the firms’ production operations.
As documented in Table 2, a large proportion of the firms in our sample do not use
prepayments. Moreover, a number of regressors in our equations, such as inventories, bank
loans and liquid assets, are potentially endogenous. These considerations motivate us to use
an instrumental variables approach for Tobit models which is due to Smith and Blundell
(1986). Lagged values of the endogenous regressors are used as instruments. The estimation
of Tobit models with endogenous regressors involves two steps: (i) running a linear
regression of each endogenous regressor on the instrumental variables and all other
exogenous regressors, and (ii) estimating the Tobit model by including the residual terms
from step (i) in the list of covariates. The residuals are correction terms for the endogeneity
problem, and jointly significant coefficients on these terms can be taken as evidence in favour
of the hypothesis that the relevant regressors are indeed endogenous.
To ensure robustness to the choice of estimator, we employ a number of alternative
estimation strategies. Besides the maximum-likelihood estimator we report results using the
Newey's minimum chi-squared estimator. Morever, as the instrumental variables estimators12
do not take into account the panel structure of our data, we also report the results obtained
from a random effects Tobit model. Finally, we define two new dependent variables as
dummies taking value 1 if customer prepayments (equation 1) and prepayments to suppliers
(equation 2) are positive, and 0 otherwise. We then estimate our models using a random
effects Probit estimator. The endogenous variables are replaced with their first lags in both
panel estimators to correct for endogeneity.
5. Econometric results
5.1 Upstream market
We start our analysis from the point of view of the upstream firms. The marginal
effects from our estimates of equation (1) are reported in Table 4 for total stocks of
inventories (columns 1-4) and inventories at advanced stages of fabrication (columns 5-8).
Equation (1) is estimated using a number of estimators. The marginal effects from the IV
Tobit estimation of equation (1) are presented in Table 4, columns 1 (for Stocks) and 5 (for
Wifs). We also report the parameter estimates from the two step Newey minimum chi squared
estimator in columns 2 (for total stocks) and 6 (for work in progress and finished goods). The
null hypothesis of the exogeneity of regressors is emphatically rejected, vindicating the use of
the instrumental variables estimator. Nevertheless, we report in the rest of the columns the
marginal effects from the random effects Tobit and the random effects Probit estimators. We
believe that if all our estimators deliver similar results, then they can be considered reliable.
<Table 4 about here>
Receiving advance payments from their customers increases the stocks of inventories
of upstream firms. The significantly large marginal effects (parameter estimates in columns 2
and 6) presented in Table 4 suggest that there is a strong positive correlation between
inventories and customer prepayments. These results are not sensitive to the choice of
estimator and support our first hypothesis (H1): downstream firms subsidize storage costs for
upstream firms and induce them to hold more inventories and continue production. The
correlation is even stronger in columns 5 to 8 when we replace total stocks with inventories
closer to final stages of production (Wifs).
Our results support the hypothesis that customer prepayments are correlated with the
characteristics of the traded goods (H2). Both the dummy for the differentiated goods sector
and the dummy for the construction sector attract positive and highly significant coefficients.
These findings are in line with the summary statistics presented in Table 2. Our results
suggest that differentiated goods producers are likely to receive higher prepayments from13
their customers than standardized goods producers. The impact is twice larger in the case of
construction firms. These suppliers receive higher advance payments because they produce
more specialised products and services than manufacturers of standardized goods and
downstream firms are more dependent on these specific inputs.
The next two rows in Table 4 provide evidence supporting our third and forth
hypotheses: the transfer of liquid cash from the downstream firms reduces the need of bank
loans (H3) and increases the liquidity (H4) of the receiving upstream firms. The negative
relationship between prepayments received from customers and the use of short term bank
loans is confirmed by the large and highly significant estimates produced by all estimators.
The table also reports positive marginal effects (Newey parameter estimates in columns 2 and
6) for the liquidity variable (insignificant in the panel estimators though).
We also find evidence that low profitability upstream firms facing a low probability
of future default receive higher prepayments from their downstream customers (H5). This is
evidenced by the negative and highly significant impact exerted by the variables Profitability
and Risk. These results are in line with the survey data evidence provided by Giannetti et al.
(2011) and Petersen and Rajan (1997), who find that more profitable firms are likely to be
offered less trade credit. Similarly, downstream firms subsidize the production of their
suppliers of specialized inputs when the latter have lower profitability as long as they do not
face an increased risk of failure. Finally, larger upstream firms are likely to receive more
prepayments from their downstream customers.
5.2 Downstream market
We turn now our attention to the downstream market and investigate prepayments to
suppliers from the buyer’s point of view. In order to link prepayments to suppliers with the
input characteristics, we construct the variables Pdiff, defined as the proportion of
differentiated goods inputs used by the firm, and Pserv, the proportion of service inputs from
non-manufacturing industries over total inputs. The information is derived from the input-
output tables from INSEAD in a similar way that Giannetti et al. (2011) extracted this
information from US input-output tables. Mateut et al. (2011) use the same approach in their
analysis of trade credit taken by French firms.
< Table 5 about here >
As in the case of customer prepayments in the upstream market, we report in Table 5
our results for the IV Tobit, the Newey estimator, the random effects Tobit, and the random
effects Probit estimator for total stocks (columns 1-4) and for raw material inventories14
(columns 5-8). Our findings are very similar across estimators and definition of the stocks
variable in terms of sign and significance of the coefficients on our variables.
We find that prepayments to suppliers and buyers’ stocks of inventories are positively
correlated. This is a prediction of the Daripa and Nilsen (2011) model: prepayment arises
whenever the downstream firm has better credit terms and thus finds it optimal to subsidize
inventories of the upstream supplier to ensure continued production. Moreover, as the aim of
the downstream firm is to be able to meet its uncertain final demand it, therefore, holds
higher stocks of inventories. The result is also consistent with the storage cost theory in
Bougheas et al. (2009) and provides evidence supporting our first hypothesis regarding the
relationship between prepayments and inventories in the downstream market. The positive
correlation between prepayments and inventories is confirmed by all estimators and appears
to be stronger when inventories are inputs from upstream firms (Raws).
Table 5 confirms that prepayments to suppliers are related to input characteristics.
Firms requiring a higher proportion of differentiated inputs prepay more their suppliers.
Similarly, a higher proportion of service inputs relative to standardized inputs increases the
volume of prepayments to suppliers. In other words, downstream firms requiring more
specialized inputs are more likely to prepay their suppliers. These results confirm the
prediction in Daripa and Nilsen (2011) and are in line with the findings in Giannetti et al.
(2011) and Mateut et al. (2011) for trade credit taken.
Contrary to our findings for the upstream firms, prepayments to suppliers imply a
lower liquidity and may mean a stronger reliance on external funding for downstream firms.
These are reflected by the negative sign for Liquidity and the positive sign for BankLoans in
Table 5 as opposed to the signs reported in Table 4. Being a transfer of liquid cash from
downstream to upstream firms, prepayments to suppliers have opposing effects on the
liquidity and bank funding ratio of the two firms. These results provide evidence for the third
and fourth hypotheses.
Confirmation of the theoretical prediction in Daripa and Nilsen (2011) that higher
profit margin in the downstream market leads to prepayments to suppliers is found in Table 5.
The variable Profits has larger marginal effects on the likelihood that the downstream firm
prepays its suppliers than any other firm characteristic (H5). Profits gauge the incentives of
the downstream firms to subsidize their suppliers and sustain continued production.
Our results also suggest that larger firms in terms of real assets are more likely to
prepay their suppliers. Daripa and Nilsen (2011) use the observation that often large firms in
developed economies prepay their suppliers to show that prepayment is not a response to15
default risk but rather arises as a solution when the upstream firm considers delaying
production. We investigate this issue further in section 5.4.
5.3 Industry concentration
In our estimations so far we have not controlled directly for the industry concentration
in the supplier’s market. Table 6A (for Stocks) and Table 6B (for Wifs) report results using all
four estimators when we include a two-digit industry concentration measure and / or the share
of the supplier’s sales into its own two-digit industry total sales in equation (1). While our
previous results remain, we find that suppliers in less concentrated industries are more likely
to receive prepayments from their customers, when we use instrumental variables estimators.
Similarly, firms with a higher share in total industry sales are likely to receive lower
prepayments from their buyers. These results support the hypothesis that suppliers in more
concentrated industries have a lower incentive to delay production and therefore their
customers need to make lower advance payments (H6).
< Tables 6A and 6B about here >
The direct impact of the downstream market concentration on prepayments to
suppliers is captured by the inclusion of the two industry concentration measures in equation
(2). These results are reported in Table 7A (for Stocks) and Table 7B (for Raws). While the
share of the firm’s sales into its own two-digit industry sales has no impact on the incidence
of prepayments to suppliers, higher concentration in the downstream market increases
prepayments to suppliers. This result is suggested by the positive and significant impact
exerted by the industry concentration variable irrespective of the choice of estimator. Besides
profit margin, industry concentration could proxy the probability that a final customer arrives
and a successful sale occurs in Daripa and Nilsen (2011). Increased probability that a final
sale occurs gives the downstream firm an incentive to prepay its supplier to ensure continued
production. The results thus support the hypothesis that industry concentration is positively
correlated with prepayments to suppliers (H6).
< Tables 7A and 7B about here >
5.4 Company default risk
In all specifications, we have controlled for the probability that the firm defaults in the
near future by including the variable Risk. The results presented in Table 4 and Tables 6
suggest that lower risk suppliers receive more prepayments from their customers (when we
use instrumental variables estimators). In other words, the supply of advance payments is16
negatively correlated with the perceived risk that suppliers will eventually deliver the inputs.
At the same time, our results suggest that suppliers demand their riskier buyers to make larger
advance payments as evidenced in Table 7B (instrumental variables estimators). We
investigate the default risk hypothesis of prepayment further and re-estimate all our models
including the age of the firm among the explanatory variables.
Controlling for firm age allows us to investigate whether prepayments are correlated
with default risk. Firm age could proxy one the one hand, the strength of the relationship
between supplier and buyer. On the other hand, the age of the firm provides a proxy for the
likelihood of firm failure as it has been shown that younger firms have a higher mortality rate
(Disney et al., 2003). As the observed prepayment figures are the result of the equilibrium
between the demand by upstream firms to be paid in advance and the supply of prepayment
by downstream firms, our findings suggest that both default risk and length of relationship
matter. While our previous findings remain, the new sets of results, reported in Table 8 only
for the main specifications for brevity, suggest that younger firms facing a low default risk
receive higher prepayments from their customers. In other words, downstream firms support
their younger suppliers of specialized inputs as long as the latter face a low default risk
(negative sign for Risk in the IV estimations). In the downstream market, in line with Antras
and Foley (2011), younger firms prepay more than their older counterparts as suppliers are
more likely to demand advance cash payment terms from their newer customers. Interestingly,
the Risk variable loses significance when we control for downstream firm age. Overall, the
results presented in Table 8 suggest that firm default risk is also a key determinant of
prepayments.
< Table 8 about here >
To summarise, our results suggest that prepayments to upstream suppliers of inputs
are influenced by the incentive of downstream firms to meet their uncertain final demand.
The strength of the supplier-customer relationship, the use of specialized inputs
(differentiated goods or services requiring a long production cycle), higher profitability in the
downstream market, and company default risk are factors that induce downstream buyers
facing better credit terms to subsidize inventory costs for their upstream suppliers.
6. Conclusions
This paper provides, to the best of our knowledge, the first detailed empirical study on
the determinants of prepayments by firms. We have used detailed information on large panels
of French manufacturing and construction firms to show that there is a positive correlation17
between prepayments and stocks of inventories. This finding provides support for the
theoretical prediction in Daripa in Nilsen (2011) that downstream firms facing better credit
terms prepay (part of) their inputs whenever their upstream suppliers would otherwise delay
production and delivery of inputs. Receiving advance payment from their customers gives
upstream firms an incentive to continue production. At the same time, downstream firms
increase their stocks of inputs and produce, in an attempt to meet their stochastic final
demand. Moreover, our results show that prepayments are used also in cases of firm default
risk. Riskier firms receive lower prepayments from their customers and are demanded to
make larger advance payments to their suppliers. Our other findings suggest that both firm
characteristics including profitability, liquidity, access to bank funding, and size, and industry
characteristics such as the type of the traded goods and competition measures exert an impact
on the volume of prepayments and are in line with the results obtained by recent empirical
works (Giannetti et al., 2011, and Mateut et al., 2011) on the related aspect of delayed
payment for the transfer of inputs to downstream firms (trade credit extended).
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Appendix
The classification of the manufacturing firms into differentiated or standardized follows





15 Food products and beverages 0
16 Tobacco products 0
17 Textiles 0
18 Wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 0
19 Tanning and dressing of leather; luggage, handbags, saddlery harness and
footwear
0
20 Wood and products of wood and cork, except furniture; articles of straw and
plaiting materials
0
21 Pulp, paper and paper products; publishing and printing 0
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 1
23 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 0
24 Chemicals and chemical products 0
25 Rubber and plastic products 1
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 0
27 Basic metals 0
28 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 1
29 Machinery and equipment not elsewhere classified 1
30 Office machinery and computers 1
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus not elsewhere classified 1
32 Radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 1
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 1
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 1
35 Other transport equipment 1
36 Furniture, manufacturing not elsewhere classified 1
Firms in the two-digit SIC code 16, Tobacco products, are excluded due to the low number of
observations.
Definition of variables
CustomersPrepay = prepayments received from customers scaled by firm turnover
PrepaySuppliers = prepayments to own suppliers scaled by firm turnover
BankLoans = bank borrowings scaled by turnover
Stocks = total stocks of inventories scaled by turnover
There are four types of stocks in the French accounting system:
1. raw materials and consumables = the basic materials purchased from other firms to be
used in the firm's production operations,
2. work in progress = low partially finished goods requiring (important) additional work
before they become finished goods (more than 50% of the production process remains to do),20
3. semi-finished and finished goods= high partially finished goods requiring (weak)
additional work before they become goods for sale (less than 50% of the production process
remains to do)
4. goods for sale= goods on which the production has been totally completed but that are
not yet sold.
Wifs = the sum of work in progress, semi-finished and finished goods, and goods for sale
scaled by turnover
Raws = raw materials and consumables (the basic materials purchased from other firms to be
used in the firm's production operations) scaled by turnover
Profits = profit/loss for the period scaled by turnover
Liquidity = liquid assets include cash and bank deposits scaled by turnover
Risk = measures the probability that the firm will be in default in the near future. It takes 10
values (1-10), with higher values indicating higher risk.
Risk = 10 if NPC < -4, i.e. a 90% probability of default in a near future,
= 9 if -4 <= NPC < 0, i.e. there is 80% probability of default in a near future,
= 8 if 0 <= NPC < 2, i.e. there is 70% probability of default in a near future,
= 7 if 2 <= NPC < 5, i.e. there is 60% probability of default in a near future,
= 6 if 5 <= NPC < 6, i.e. there is 50% probability of default in a near future,
= 5 if 6 <= NPC < 8, i.e. there is 40% probability of default in a near future,
= 4 if 8 <= NPC < 10, i.e. there is 30% probability of default in a near future,
= 3 if 10 <= NPC < 13, i.e. there is 20% probability of default in a near future,
= 2 if 13 <= NPC < 16, i.e. there is 10% probability of default in a near future,
= 1 if NPC >= 16.
Size = logarithm of real total assets
Age = number of years since the firm was established
Differentiated = 1 if the manufacturing firm produces differentiated goods, 0 otherwise. See
Sector classification of firms.
Standardized = 1 if the manufacturing firm produces standardized goods, 0 otherwise. See
Sector classification of firms.
Construction = 1 for firms operating in industry SIC code 45, 0 otherwise.
Pdiff = proportion of differentiated inputs in total inputs used by firms in the same industry.
Values calculated using data from the input-output tables with 117 entries available from
INSEAD.
Pserv = proportion of service inputs in total inputs used by firms in the same industry. Values
calculated using data from the input-output tables with 117 entries available from INSEAD.
Ind. concentration = market share of the eight largest firms in the firm’s two-digit industry
Ind. share = share of own sales to total two-digit industry sales21
Table 1
Panel A. Sector composition
Sector Freq. Percent Cum.
Differentiated 103,285 34.28 34.28
Standardized 61,120 20.29 54.57
Construction 136,884 45.43 100.00
Total 301,289 100.00
Panel B. Structure of the panel data
Total Differentiated Standardized Construction
No years Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
4 4,236 1.41 1,264 1.22 816 1.34 2,156 1.58
5 6,480 2.15 2,077 2.01 1,532 2.51 2,871 2.1
6 9,384 3.11 2,980 2.89 2,229 3.65 4,175 3.05
7 13,389 4.44 4,362 4.22 2,988 4.89 6,039 4.41
8 30,116 10 10,406 10.08 6,415 10.5 13,295 9.71
9 237,684 78.89 82,196 79.58 47,140 77.13 108,348 79.15
Total 301,289 100 103,285 100 61,120 100 136,884 10022
Table 2. Use of prepayments by sector
Total Differentiated Standardized Construction
Variable Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
Upstream firms
Dummy customer prepayments 0.2819 0.4499 0.2785 0.4483 0.1738 0.3790 0.3327 0.4712
Customer prepayments 0.0074 0.0309 0.0060 0.0252 0.0019 0.0123 0.0108 0.0390
Observations 301289 103285 61120 136884
Downstream firms
Dummy prepayments to suppliers 0.2783 0.4482 0.3029 0.4595 0.2983 0.4575 0.2501 0.4331
Prepayments to suppliers 0.0011 0.0035 0.0012 0.0038 0.0012 0.0036 0.0009 0.0032
Observations 294204 102982 59165 132057
Note: The table reports means and standard deviations. The dummy variables take value 1 if customer prepayments and
prepayments to suppliers, respectively, are positive and 0 otherwise. Customer prepayments denote prepayments received
from customers scaled by upstream firms’ turnover. Prepayments to suppliers are scaled by downstream firms’ total assets.23
Table 3A. Summary statistics of main variables
Total Differentiated Standardized Construction
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
BankLoans 0.0520 0.0713 0.0569 0.0743 0.0703 0.0909 0.0402 0.0552
Stocks 0.0756 0.0757 0.0983 0.0805 0.0969 0.0864 0.0490 0.0556
Wifs 0.0408 0.0545 0.0526 0.0589 0.0493 0.0594 0.0280 0.0453
Risk 2.1783 1.7503 2.1736 1.8069 2.2452 1.8688 2.1519 1.6485
Profits 0.0335 0.0406 0.0336 0.0436 0.0296 0.0424 0.0353 0.0371
Liquidity 0.0556 0.0623 0.0533 0.0618 0.0495 0.0584 0.0601 0.0640
Assets (ln) 2.5223 1.2586 2.8109 1.2296 2.9607 1.4791 2.1087 1.0245
Age 19.1609 14.1431 20.2674 14.6914 21.5293 15.7379 17.2820 12.6552
Ind. concentration 0.1680 0.1366 0.2243 0.1853 0.2188 0.0943 0.1028 0.0582
Ind. share 0.0003 0.0014 0.0004 0.0019 0.0006 0.0019 0.0002 0.0005
Note: The table reports means and standard deviations. Differentiated denote firms in manufacturing differentiated goods sector, Standardized are firms in manufacturing standardized goods
sector, and Construction denotes firms in construction. BankLoans represents short-term bank loans; Stocks stands for total stocks inventories, while Wifs excludes raw materials from total
stocks; Risk measures the likelihood of company failure, where a higher value indicates that the firm is more risky. Profits gives the firm's profit (or loss) for the period; Liquidity represents
firm's liquid assets (cash, bank deposits, and other current assets). With the exception of Risk all other variables are scaled by total sales. Assets denote the logarithm of firms real assets. Ind.
concentration is the market share of the eight largest firms in the firm’s two-digit industry. Ind. share is the share of own sales in total two-digit industry sales.24
Table 3B. Correlation coefficients – Upstream market
Customers
Prepay BankLoans Stocks Wifs Risk Profits Liquidity Assets (ln) Age Ind. conce.
BankLoans -0.0454* 1
Stocks 0.1932* 0.1470* 1
Wifs 0.2605* 0.0966* 0.8058* 1
Risk 0.0129* 0.0965* 0.2102* 0.1775* 1
Profits -0.0038* -0.1210* -0.1288* -0.1084* -0.5533* 1
Liquidity 0.0239* -0.1189* -0.1334* -0.1022* -0.2821* 0.3129* 1
Assets (ln) 0.0445* 0.0292* 0.2698* 0.2456* -0.0552* -0.0029* -0.0800* 1
Age 0.0058* -0.0432* 0.1819* 0.1641* -0.0439* -0.0640* 0.0126* 0.3162* 1
Ind. conce -0.0451* 0.0344* 0.2354* 0.1525* 0.0224* -0.0140* -0.0465* 0.2182* 0.0543* 1
Ind. share -0.0056* -0.0117* 0.0823* 0.0752* -0.0021* -0.0219* -0.0566* 0.3564* 0.0861* 0.1452*
Note: The table reports correlation coefficients. BankLoans represents short-term bank loans; Stocks stands for total stocks inventories, while Wifs excludes raw materials from total stocks; Risk
measures the likelihood of company failure, where a higher value indicates that the firm is more risky. Profits gives the firm's profit (or loss) for the period; Liquidity represents firm's liquid
assets (cash, bank deposits, and other current assets). With the exception of Risk all other variables are scaled by total sales. Assets denote the logarithm of firms real assets. Ind. concentration is
the market share of the eight largest firms in the firm’s two-digit industry. Ind. share is the share of own sales in total two-digit industry sales.
* indicates significance at 5% level.25
Table 3C. Correlation coefficients – Downstream market
Prepay
Suppliers BankLoans Stocks Wifs Risk Profits Liquidity Assets (ln) Age Ind. conce.
BankLoans 0.0113* 1
Stocks 0.0446* 0.0563* 1
Raws 0.0263* 0.0869* 0.5405* 1
Risk 0.0217* 0.1539* 0.2754* 0.1616* 1
Profits -0.0130* -0.1901* -0.2002* -0.1123* -0.5543* 1
Liquidity -0.0334* -0.2196* -0.2192* -0.1441* -0.2549* 0.2842* 1
Assets (ln) 0.0432* -0.0754* 0.1771* 0.0360* -0.0380* -0.1140* -0.1951* 1
Age -0.0061* -0.0769* 0.1407* 0.0642* -0.0454* -0.1072* -0.0318* 0.3026* 1
Ind. conce 0.0349* 0.0172* 0.1960* 0.2210* 0.0124* -0.0557* -0.0898* 0.2404* 0.0665* 1
Ind. share 0.0236* -0.0129* 0.0768* 0.0567* -0.0051* -0.0322* -0.0661* 0.3150* 0.0777* 0.1709*
Note: The table reports correlation coefficients. BankLoans represents short-term bank loans; Stocks stands for total stocks inventories, while Raws are the basic materials purchased from other
firms to be used in the firm's production operations; Risk measures the likelihood of company failure, where a higher value indicates that the firm is more risky. Profits gives the firm's profit (or
loss) for the period; Liquidity represents firm's liquid assets (cash, bank deposits, and other current assets). With the exception of Risk all other variables are scaled by total assets in the
downstream market specifications. Assets denote the logarithm of firms real assets. Ind. concentration is the market share of the eight largest firms in the firm’s two-digit industry. Ind. share is
the share of own sales in total two-digit industry sales.
* indicates significance at 5% level.26
Table 4. Upstream firms – customer prepayments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)








Stocks 0.0639*** 0.275*** 0.0211*** 2.812***
(0.0008) (0.0027) (0.0007) (0.101)
Wifs 0.0869*** 0.372*** 0.0242*** 2.972***
(0.0011) (0.0035) (0.0008) (0.127)
Liquidity 0.0045*** 0.0195*** 0.000615 -0.100 0.0027*** 0.0117*** 0.0003 -0.152*
(0.001) (0.0042) (0.0006) (0.0919) (0.001) (0.0042) (0.0006) (0.0920)
BankLoans -0.0195*** -0.0840*** -0.0056*** -0.619*** -0.0163*** -0.0700*** -0.0048*** -0.489***
(0.0008) (0.0033) (0.000594) (0.0862) (0.0007) (0.0032) (0.0006) (0.0858)
Risk -0.0002*** -0.0007*** -1.92e-05 -0.0017 -8.42e-05*** -0.000361*** -2.21e-06 0.0010
(2.81e-05) (0.0001) (2.45e-05) (0.0037) (2.78e-05) (0.0001) (2.45e-05) (0.0037)
Profits -0.00420*** -0.0181*** -0.0083*** -0.671*** -0.0029** -0.0123** -0.0085*** -0.713***
(0.0012) (0.0051) (0.00105) (0.156) (0.0012) (0.005) (0.0011) (0.156)
Size 0.0016*** 0.007*** 0.00301*** 0.341*** 0.0015*** 0.0064*** 0.003*** 0.344***
(3.44e-05) (0.0001) (6.16e-05) (0.0086) (3.36e-05) (0.000135) (6.17e-05) (0.00862)
Differentiated 0.0057*** 0.0237*** 0.0068*** 0.870*** 0.0054*** 0.0222*** 0.0068*** 0.865***
(0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0320) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0321)
Construction 0.0136*** 0.0563*** 0.0136*** 1.604*** 0.0120*** 0.0498*** 0.0131*** 1.539***
(0.0001) (0.0005) (0.000257) (0.0321) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0320)
Observations 263,619 263,619 263,619 263,619 263,619 263,619 263,619 263,619
Chi(2) 35.87 50.14 49.11 81.49
p 2.10e-09 7.46e-11 0 0
No. uncensored 74654 74654 74654 74654 74654 74654
No. left-censored 188965 188965 188965 188965 188965 188965
No. of firms 37,670 37,670 37,670 37,670
Rho 0.732 0.777 0.732 0.779
Log Likelihood 76616 -103084 76553 -103196
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All dependent and independent variables are defined in Tables 2 and 3. All specifications control for time effects. The table reports marginal effects and standard errors (robust standard errors in columns 1 and 5)
in parentheses. Columns 2 and 6 report parameter estimates using the two-step Newey estimator. Chi(2) and p represent the χ
2 statistic and the corresponding probability for the exogeneity tests in columns 1, 2, 5, and
6. In the panel estimations (columns 3, 4, 7 and 8), the variables Stocks, Wifs, BankLoans, and Liquidity are replaced by their first lags. The table also reports the number of uncensored and left-censored observations,
the number of firms in the panel specifications, Rho, the fraction attributable to the panel element, and the Log Likelihood.27
Table 5. Downstream firms – prepayments to suppliers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES IV Tobit Newey Random effects Tobit Random effects
Probit
IV Tobit Newey Random effects Tobit Random effects
Probit
Stocks 0.000892*** 0.00369*** 0.000486*** 0.374***
(4.76e-05) (0.000201) (6.05e-05) (0.0504)
Raws 0.00136*** 0.00564*** 0.000902*** 0.700***
(8.86e-05) (0.000366) (0.000117) (0.0975)
Liquidity -0.000707*** -0.00292*** -0.000183*** -0.175*** -0.000779*** -0.00322*** -0.000209*** -0.194***
(8.97e-05) (0.000368) (6.08e-05) (0.0489) (8.97e-05) (0.000367) (6.05e-05) (0.0486)
BankLoans 0.000298*** 0.00123*** 1.92e-05 0.0853 0.000262*** 0.00108*** 5.11e-06 0.0747
(5.51e-05) (0.000229) (6.63e-05) (0.0541) (5.52e-05) (0.000229) (6.63e-05) (0.0541)
Risk 2.44e-06 1.01e-05 -4.08e-06 -0.0125*** 1.12e-05*** 4.62e-05*** -2.57e-06 -0.0114***
(3.85e-06) (1.57e-05) (4.20e-06) (0.00345) (3.80e-06) (1.54e-05) (4.19e-06) (0.00344)
Profits 0.000529*** 0.00219*** 0.000202** 0.0973 0.000507*** 0.00210*** 0.000194** 0.0916
(9.40e-05) (0.000386) (9.84e-05) (0.0798) (9.39e-05) (0.000386) (9.84e-05) (0.0798)
Size 0.000260*** 0.00108*** 0.000264*** 0.339*** 0.000272*** 0.00113*** 0.000271*** 0.344***
(4.08e-06) (1.79e-05) (7.37e-06) (0.00642) (4.07e-06) (1.79e-05) (7.35e-06) (0.00640)
Pdiff 0.000321*** 0.00133*** 0.000294*** 0.336*** 0.000356*** 0.00147*** 0.000313*** 0.351***
(4.25e-05) (0.000178) (8.24e-05) (0.0713) (4.26e-05) (0.000178) (8.24e-05) (0.0712)
Pserv 0.000100** 0.000414** -0.000103 0.112 0.000111*** 0.000461** -7.91e-05 0.131*
(4.18e-05) (0.000178) (8.09e-05) (0.0694) (4.26e-05) (0.000180) (8.14e-05) (0.0698)
Observations 252,754 252,754 252,754 252,754 252,754 252,754 252,754 252,754
Chi(2) 25.63 27.71 24.81 26.46
p 4.13e-07 9.60e-07 6.33e-07 1.79e-06
No. uncensored 70545 70545 70545 70545 70545 70545
No. left-censored 182209 182209 182209 182209 182209 182209
No. of firms 36,404 36,404 36,404 36,404
Rho 0.518 0.643 0.519 0.643
Log Likelihood 185294 -114459 185291 -114461
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: See Tables 2 and 3 for variables definition. Variables are scaled by total assets in the downstream market specification. Raws are the basic materials purchased from other firms to be
used in the firm's production operations. All specifications control for time effects. The table reports marginal effects and standard errors (robust standard errors in columns 1 and 5) in
parentheses. Columns 2 and 6 report parameter estimates using the two-step Newey estimator. Chi(2) and p represent the χ
2 statistic and the corresponding probability for the exogeneity tests in
columns 1, 2, 5, and 6. In the panel estimations, columns 3, 4, 7, and 8, the variables Stocks, Raws and Liquidity are replaced by their first lags. The table also reports the number of uncensored and
left-censored observations, the number of firms in the panel specifications, Rho, the fraction attributable to the panel element, and the Log Likelihood.28
Table 6A. Industry concentration - Upstream firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES IV Tobit Newey Random effects Tobit Random effects Probit
Stocks 0.0642*** 0.0639*** 0.0642*** 0.277*** 0.275*** 0.277*** 0.0210*** 0.0211*** 0.0210*** 2.788*** 2.812*** 2.789***
(0.000804) (0.000798) (0.000805) (0.00269) (0.00268) (0.00269) (0.000648) (0.000647) (0.000648) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101)
Liquidity 0.00451*** 0.00451*** 0.00449*** 0.0194*** 0.0194*** 0.0194*** 0.000615 0.000614 0.000614 -0.0985 -0.0994 -0.0978
(0.00102) (0.00101) (0.00101) (0.00423) (0.00423) (0.00423) (0.000612) (0.000612) (0.000612) (0.0919) (0.0919) (0.0919)
BankLoans -0.0197*** -0.0195*** -0.0197*** -0.0847*** -0.0840*** -0.0847*** -0.00562*** -0.00562*** -0.00561*** -0.610*** -0.619*** -0.610***
(0.000776) (0.000772) (0.000774) (0.00332) (0.00331) (0.00332) (0.000594) (0.000594) (0.000594) (0.0862) (0.0862) (0.0863)
Risk -0.000153*** -0.000156*** -0.000154*** -0.000660*** -0.000670*** -0.000661*** -1.92e-05 -1.92e-05 -1.92e-05 -0.00178 -0.00165 -0.00177
(2.82e-05) (2.82e-05) (2.82e-05) (0.000116) (0.000116) (0.000116) (2.45e-05) (2.45e-05) (2.45e-05) (0.00370) (0.00370) (0.00370)
Profits -0.00411*** -0.00421*** -0.00412*** -0.0177*** -0.0181*** -0.0177*** -0.00827*** -0.00827*** -0.00827*** -0.671*** -0.671*** -0.670***
(0.00121) (0.00121) (0.00121) (0.00508) (0.00508) (0.00508) (0.00105) (0.00105) (0.00105) (0.156) (0.156) (0.156)
Size 0.00164*** 0.00163*** 0.00164*** 0.00705*** 0.00701*** 0.00707*** 0.00301*** 0.00301*** 0.00301*** 0.338*** 0.341*** 0.338***
(3.46e-05) (3.45e-05) (3.47e-05) (0.000137) (0.000137) (0.000138) (6.18e-05) (6.17e-05) (6.19e-05) (0.00862) (0.00860) (0.00862)
Differentiated 0.00573*** 0.00572*** 0.00573*** 0.0237*** 0.0237*** 0.0237*** 0.00683*** 0.00683*** 0.00683*** 0.868*** 0.870*** 0.868***
(0.000119) (0.000119) (0.000119) (0.000498) (0.000498) (0.000498) (0.000259) (0.000259) (0.000259) (0.0320) (0.0320) (0.0320)
Construction 0.0133*** 0.0136*** 0.0133*** 0.0554*** 0.0563*** 0.0554*** 0.0136*** 0.0136*** 0.0136*** 1.642*** 1.604*** 1.642***
(0.000146) (0.000145) (0.000146) (0.000543) (0.000524) (0.000543) (0.000268) (0.000257) (0.000268) (0.0336) (0.0321) (0.0336)
Ind. -0.00188*** -0.00185*** -0.00809*** -0.00795*** 5.89e-05 6.70e-05 0.343*** 0.340***
concentration (0.000295) (0.000295) (0.00131) (0.00131) (0.000635) (0.000636) (0.0885) (0.0886)
Ind. share -0.0739*** -0.0650*** -0.318** -0.280** -0.0150 -0.0152 7.131 6.176
(0.0206) (0.0211) (0.131) (0.131) (0.0461) (0.0462) (6.288) (6.281)
Observations 263,619 263,619 263,619 263,619 263,619 263,619 263,619 263,619 263,619 263,619 263,619 263,619
Chi(2) 37.23 35.99 37.27 52.30 50.15 52.28
p 1.05e-09 1.98e-09 1.03e-09 0 7.41e-11 0
No. uncens. 74654 74654 74654 74654 74654 74654 74654 74654 74654
No. left-cens. 188965 188965 188965 188965 188965 188965 188965 188965 188965
No. of firms 37,670 37,670 37,670 37,670 37,670 37,670
Rho 0.732 0.732 0.732 0.777 0.777 0.777
Log Likelihood 76616 76616 76616 -103077 -103084 -103077
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: See Tables 2 and 3 for variables definition. Variables are scaled by turnover in the upstream market specifications. All specifications control for time effects. The table reports marginal effects and standard errors
(robust standard errors in columns 1 to 3) in parentheses. Columns 4-6 report parameter estimates using the two-step Newey estimator. Chi(2) and p represent the χ
2 statistic and the corresponding probability for the
exogeneity tests in columns 1-6. In the panel estimations, columns 7- 12, the variables Stocks, BankLoans, and Liquidity are replaced by their first lags. The table also reports the number of uncensored and left-censored
observations, the number of firms in the panel specifications, Rho, the fraction attributable to the panel element, and the Log Likelihood.29
Table 6B. Industry concentration - Upstream firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES IV Tobit Newey Random effects Tobit Random effects Probit
Wifs 0.0869*** 0.0869*** 0.0869*** 0.373*** 0.372*** 0.373*** 0.0242*** 0.0242*** 0.0242*** 2.953*** 2.972*** 2.953***
(0.00114) (0.00114) (0.00114) (0.00349) (0.00349) (0.00349) (0.000797) (0.000796) (0.000797) (0.128) (0.127) (0.128)
Liquidity 0.00273*** 0.00272*** 0.00272*** 0.0117*** 0.0117*** 0.0116*** 0.000318 0.000313 0.000317 -0.149 -0.152* -0.149
(0.000996) (0.000999) (0.000998) (0.00416) (0.00416) (0.00416) (0.000612) (0.000612) (0.000612) (0.0919) (0.0920) (0.0920)
BankLoans -0.0163*** -0.0163*** -0.0163*** -0.0701*** -0.0700*** -0.0701*** -0.00474*** -0.00475*** -0.00474*** -0.479*** -0.489*** -0.479***
(0.000746) (0.000747) (0.000748) (0.00324) (0.00323) (0.00324) (0.000591) (0.000591) (0.000591) (0.0858) (0.0858) (0.0858)
Risk -8.38e-05*** -8.45e-05*** -8.41e-05*** -0.000359*** -0.000362*** -0.000360*** -2.47e-06 -2.23e-06 -2.49e-06 0.000831 0.00103 0.000839
(2.78e-05) (2.78e-05) (2.78e-05) (0.000114) (0.000114) (0.000114) (2.45e-05) (2.45e-05) (2.45e-05) (0.00369) (0.00369) (0.00369)
Profits -0.00284** -0.00287** -0.00286** -0.0122** -0.0123** -0.0122** -0.00852*** -0.00852*** -0.00852*** -0.711*** -0.713*** -0.711***
(0.00119) (0.00119) (0.00119) (0.00500) (0.00500) (0.00500) (0.00105) (0.00105) (0.00105) (0.156) (0.156) (0.156)
Size 0.00150*** 0.00151*** 0.00151*** 0.00644*** 0.00646*** 0.00647*** 0.00300*** 0.00301*** 0.00301*** 0.341*** 0.344*** 0.341***
(3.38e-05) (3.37e-05) (3.39e-05) (0.000136) (0.000136) (0.000136) (6.19e-05) (6.18e-05) (6.20e-05) (0.00865) (0.00863) (0.00866)
Differentiated 0.00537*** 0.00537*** 0.00537*** 0.0222*** 0.0222*** 0.0222*** 0.00675*** 0.00675*** 0.00675*** 0.864*** 0.866*** 0.864***
(0.000116) (0.000116) (0.000116) (0.000490) (0.000490) (0.000490) (0.000258) (0.000258) (0.000258) (0.0321) (0.0321) (0.0321)
Construction 0.0120*** 0.0120*** 0.0120*** 0.0497*** 0.0498*** 0.0497*** 0.0131*** 0.0131*** 0.0131*** 1.588*** 1.539*** 1.587***
(0.000135) (0.000132) (0.000135) (0.000523) (0.000500) (0.000523) (0.000266) (0.000254) (0.000266) (0.0336) (0.0320) (0.0336)
Ind. -0.000237 -0.000200 -0.00102 -0.000859 0.000627 0.000636 0.429*** 0.425***
concentration (0.000289) (0.000289) (0.00128) (0.00128) (0.000635) (0.000635) (0.0888) (0.0889)
Ind. share -0.0748*** -0.0739*** -0.321** -0.317** -0.0147 -0.0165 7.267 6.078
(0.0225) (0.0218) (0.129) (0.129) (0.0462) (0.0462) (6.296) (6.286)
Observations 263,619 263,619 263,619 263,619 263,619 263,619 263,619 263,619 263,619 263,619 263,619 263,619
Chi(2) 49.36 49.19 49.33 81.66 81.48 81.61
p 0 0 0 0 0 0
No. uncens. 74654 74654 74654 74654 74654 74654 74654 74654 74654
No. left-cens. 188965 188965 188965 188965 188965 188965 188965 188965 188965
No. of firms 37,670 37,670 37,670 37,670 37,670 37,670
Rho 0.732 0.732 0.732 0.779 0.779 0.779
Log Likelihood 76553 76553 76553 -103185 -103195 -103184
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: See Tables 2 and 3 for variables definition. Variables are scaled by turnover in the upstream market specifications. All specifications control for time effects. The table reports marginal effects and standard
errors (robust standard errors in columns 1 to 3) in parentheses. Columns 4-6 report parameter estimates using the two-step Newey estimator. Chi(2) and p represent the χ
2 statistic and the corresponding probability for
the exogeneity tests in columns 1-6. In the panel estimations, columns 7 - 12, the variables Wifs, BankLoans, and Liquidity are replaced by their first lags. The table also reports the number of uncensored and left-
censored observations, the number of firms in the panel specifications, Rho, the fraction attributable to the panel element, and the Log Likelihood.30
Table 7A. Industry concentration - downstream firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES IV Tobit Newey Random effects Tobit Random effects Probit
Stocks 0.000870*** 0.000890*** 0.000870*** 0.00360*** 0.00368*** 0.00360*** 0.000470*** 0.000484*** 0.000469*** 0.366*** 0.372*** 0.365***
(4.79e-05) (4.76e-05) (4.78e-05) (0.000203) (0.000201) (0.000203) (6.07e-05) (6.06e-05) (6.07e-05) (0.0506) (0.0504) (0.0506)
Liquidity -0.000707*** -0.000707*** -0.000707*** -0.00292*** -0.00292*** -0.00292*** -0.000183*** -0.000183*** -0.000182*** -0.175*** -0.175*** -0.175***
(9.04e-05) (8.99e-05) (8.98e-05) (0.000368) (0.000368) (0.000368) (6.08e-05) (6.08e-05) (6.08e-05) (0.0489) (0.0489) (0.0489)
BankLoans 0.000291*** 0.000297*** 0.000291*** 0.00120*** 0.00123*** 0.00120*** 1.66e-05 1.98e-05 1.71e-05 0.0842 0.0862 0.0851
(5.51e-05) (5.51e-05) (5.51e-05) (0.000229) (0.000229) (0.000229) (6.63e-05) (6.63e-05) (6.63e-05) (0.0541) (0.0541) (0.0541)
Risk 2.87e-06 2.39e-06 2.82e-06 1.19e-05 9.91e-06 1.17e-05 -3.99e-06 -4.08e-06 -3.99e-06 -0.0125*** -0.0125*** -0.0125***
(3.86e-06) (3.86e-06) (3.85e-06) (1.57e-05) (1.57e-05) (1.57e-05) (4.20e-06) (4.20e-06) (4.20e-06) (0.00345) (0.00345) (0.00345)
Profits 0.000532*** 0.000527*** 0.000530*** 0.00220*** 0.00218*** 0.00219*** 0.000205** 0.000201** 0.000204** 0.0992 0.0966 0.0984
(9.39e-05) (9.40e-05) (9.39e-05) (0.000386) (0.000386) (0.000386) (9.84e-05) (9.84e-05) (9.84e-05) (0.0798) (0.0798) (0.0798)
Size 0.000257*** 0.000257*** 0.000255*** 0.00106*** 0.00106*** 0.00106*** 0.000260*** 0.000260*** 0.000258*** 0.337*** 0.335*** 0.334***
(4.12e-06) (4.30e-06) (4.31e-06) (1.81e-05) (1.87e-05) (1.88e-05) (7.43e-06) (7.67e-06) (7.70e-06) (0.00647) (0.00665) (0.00668)
Pdiff 0.000231*** 0.000322*** 0.000236*** 0.000955*** 0.00133*** 0.000975*** 0.000156* 0.000296*** 0.000162* 0.263*** 0.338*** 0.271***
(4.69e-05) (4.25e-05) (4.70e-05) (0.000196) (0.000178) (0.000196) (9.04e-05) (8.24e-05) (9.05e-05) (0.0782) (0.0713) (0.0783)
Pserv 0.000222*** 0.000101** 0.000217*** 0.000920*** 0.000416** 0.000899*** 9.05e-05 -0.000102 8.49e-05 0.216*** 0.114 0.208**
(5.00e-05) (4.18e-05) (5.01e-05) (0.000210) (0.000178) (0.000210) (9.62e-05) (8.09e-05) (9.64e-05) (0.0828) (0.0694) (0.0829)
Ind. 0.000200*** 0.000192*** 0.000829*** 0.000793*** 0.000309*** 0.000299*** 0.165** 0.150**
concentration (4.37e-05) (4.41e-05) (0.000183) (0.000184) (8.34e-05) (8.40e-05) (0.0721) (0.0726)
Ind. share 0.00643** 0.00476* 0.0266** 0.0197 0.00823 0.00597 10.15** 9.036*
(0.00284) (0.00280) (0.0126) (0.0128) (0.00558) (0.00564) (4.874) (4.909)
Observations 252,754 252,754 252,754 252,754 252,754 252,754 252,754 252,754 252,754 252,754 252,754 252,754
Chi(2) 24.86 25.57 24.95 26.97 27.61 26.93
p 6.18e-07 4.26e-07 5.87e-07 1.39e-06 1.01e-06 1.42e-06
No. uncens. 70545 70545 70545 70545 70545 70545 70545 70545 70545
No. left-cens. 182209 182209 182209 182209 182209 182209 182209 182209 182209
No. of firms 36,404 36,404 36,404 36,404 36,404 36,404
Rho 0.518 0.518 0.518 0.643 0.643 0.643
Log Likelihood 185301 185295 185301 -114457 -114457 -114455
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: See Tables 2 and 3 for variables definition. Variables are scaled by total assets in the downstream market specifications. All specifications control for time effects. The table reports marginal effects and standard
errors (robust standard errors in columns 1 to 3) in parentheses. Columns 4-6 report parameter estimates using the two-step Newey estimator. Chi(2) and p represent the χ
2 statistic and the corresponding probability for
the exogeneity tests in columns 1-6. In the panel estimations, columns 7 - 12, the variables Stocks and Liquidity are replaced by their first lags. The table also reports the number of uncensored and left-censored
observations, the number of firms in the panel specifications, Rho, the fraction attributable to the panel element, and the Log Likelihood.31
Table 7B. Industry concentration - Downstream firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES IV Tobit Newey Random effects Tobit Random effects Probit
Raws 0.00131*** 0.00136*** 0.00131*** 0.00542*** 0.00561*** 0.00540*** 0.000855*** 0.000896*** 0.000852*** 0.678*** 0.693*** 0.673***
(9.04e-05) (8.87e-05) (9.02e-05) (0.000371) (0.000366) (0.000371) (0.000118) (0.000118) (0.000118) (0.0981) (0.0976) (0.0981)
Liquidity -0.000779*** -0.000779*** -0.000779*** -0.00322*** -0.00322*** -0.00322*** -0.000209*** -0.000209*** -0.000208*** -0.194*** -0.194*** -0.194***
(8.95e-05) (8.97e-05) (8.98e-05) (0.000367) (0.000367) (0.000367) (6.05e-05) (6.05e-05) (6.05e-05) (0.0486) (0.0486) (0.0486)
BankLoans 0.000257*** 0.000261*** 0.000257*** 0.00106*** 0.00108*** 0.00106*** 3.26e-06 5.68e-06 3.73e-06 0.0740 0.0756 0.0748
(5.52e-05) (5.52e-05) (5.52e-05) (0.000229) (0.000229) (0.000229) (6.63e-05) (6.63e-05) (6.63e-05) (0.0541) (0.0541) (0.0541)
Risk 1.15e-05*** 1.11e-05*** 1.15e-05*** 4.75e-05*** 4.61e-05*** 4.74e-05*** -2.48e-06 -2.56e-06 -2.48e-06 -0.0113*** -0.0114*** -0.0113***
(3.80e-06) (3.80e-06) (3.80e-06) (1.54e-05) (1.54e-05) (1.54e-05) (4.19e-06) (4.19e-06) (4.19e-06) (0.00344) (0.00344) (0.00344)
Profits 0.000510*** 0.000505*** 0.000509*** 0.00211*** 0.00209*** 0.00210*** 0.000198** 0.000193** 0.000197** 0.0936 0.0911 0.0929
(9.38e-05) (9.39e-05) (9.39e-05) (0.000386) (0.000386) (0.000386) (9.84e-05) (9.84e-05) (9.84e-05) (0.0798) (0.0798) (0.0798)
Size 0.000270*** 0.000270*** 0.000268*** 0.00112*** 0.00112*** 0.00111*** 0.000267*** 0.000268*** 0.000265*** 0.342*** 0.341*** 0.339***
(4.12e-06) (4.28e-06) (4.31e-06) (1.81e-05) (1.87e-05) (1.88e-05) (7.42e-06) (7.65e-06) (7.70e-06) (0.00646) (0.00664) (0.00667)
Pdiff 0.000276*** 0.000357*** 0.000280*** 0.00114*** 0.00148*** 0.00116*** 0.000186** 0.000315*** 0.000190** 0.286*** 0.352*** 0.293***
(4.71e-05) (4.26e-05) (4.72e-05) (0.000196) (0.000178) (0.000197) (9.04e-05) (8.24e-05) (9.06e-05) (0.0782) (0.0712) (0.0783)
Pserv 0.000216*** 0.000111*** 0.000212*** 0.000895*** 0.000460** 0.000878*** 9.67e-05 -7.86e-05 9.16e-05 0.221*** 0.132* 0.213**
(5.02e-05) (4.26e-05) (5.03e-05) (0.000210) (0.000180) (0.000210) (9.64e-05) (8.14e-05) (9.65e-05) (0.0829) (0.0698) (0.0830)
Ind. 0.000177*** 0.000170*** 0.000733*** 0.000705*** 0.000286*** 0.000277*** 0.145** 0.132*
concentration (4.45e-05) (4.48e-05) (0.000185) (0.000186) (8.38e-05) (8.43e-05) (0.0724) (0.0728)
Ind. share 0.00530* 0.00388 0.0219* 0.0161 0.00744 0.00541 9.496* 8.544*
(0.00278) (0.00276) (0.0127) (0.0128) (0.00560) (0.00564) (4.878) (4.911)
Observations 252,754 252,754 252,754 252,754 252,754 252,754 252,754 252,754 252,754 252,754 252,754 252,754
Chi(2) 23.69 24.68 23.59 25.36 26.28 25.27
p 1.13e-06 6.75e-07 1.19e-06 3.12e-06 1.96e-06 3.25e-06
No. uncens. 70545 70545 70545 70545 70545 70545 70545 70545 70545
No. left-cens. 182209 182209 182209 182209 182209 182209 182209 182209 182209
No. of firms 36,404 36,404 36,404 36,404 36,404 36,404
rho 0.519 0.519 0.519 0.643 0.643 0.643
Log Likelihood 185297 185292 185297 -114459 -114459 -114457
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: See Tables 2 and 3 for variables definition. Variables are scaled by total assets in the downstream market specifications. All specifications control for time effects. The table reports marginal effects and standard
errors (robust standard errors in columns 1 to 3) in parentheses. Columns 4-6 report parameter estimates using the two-step Newey estimator. Chi(2) and p represent the χ
2 statistic and the corresponding probability for
the exogeneity tests in columns 1-6. In the panel estimations, columns 7 - 12, the variables Raws and Liquidity are replaced by their first lags. The table also reports the number of uncensored and left-censored
observations, the number of firms in the panel specifications, Rho, the fraction attributable to the panel element, and the Log Likelihood.32
Table 8. Impact of age
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)








Upstream market Downstream market
Stocks 0.0650*** 0.280*** 0.0214*** 2.828*** 0.000946*** 0.00391*** 0.000519*** 0.396***
(0.000819) (0.00273) (0.000657) (0.103) (4.80e-05) (0.000203) (6.07e-05) (0.0506)





(0.00102) (0.00427) (0.000619) (0.0934) (9.00e-05) (0.000369) (6.08e-05) (0.0489)
BankLoans -0.0202*** -0.0872*** -0.00590*** -0.627*** 0.000266*** 0.00110*** -6.34e-06 0.0677





-3.16e-05 -0.00214 -1.41e-06 -5.84e-06 -5.65e-06 -0.0135***
(2.87e-05) (0.000118) (2.47e-05) (0.00374) (3.88e-06) (1.58e-05) (4.20e-06) (0.00346)
Profits -0.00559*** -0.0241*** -0.00878*** -0.622*** 0.000418*** 0.00173*** 0.000151 0.0653
(0.00123) (0.00518) (0.00106) (0.158) (9.46e-05) (0.000389) (9.86e-05) (0.0800)
Size 0.00169*** 0.00729*** 0.00310*** 0.340*** 0.000270*** 0.00112*** 0.000275*** 0.347***
(3.61e-05) (0.000144) (6.42e-05) (0.00899) (4.19e-06) (1.85e-05) (7.59e-06) (0.00663)
Differentiated 0.00554*** 0.0230*** 0.00665*** 0.856***
(0.000120) (0.000505) (0.000261) (0.0324)
Construction 0.0134*** 0.0557*** 0.0134*** 1.597***
(0.000146) (0.000528) (0.000258) (0.0325)
Pdiff 0.000298*** 0.00123*** 0.000268*** 0.318***
(4.25e-05) (0.000178) (8.24e-05) (0.0713)
Pserv 0.000103** 0.000428** -0.000107 0.109
(4.18e-05) (0.000178) (8.08e-05) (0.0694)
Age -2.87e-05*** -
0.000124***
-3.26e-05*** 4.25e-05 -3.78e-06*** -1.56e-05*** -4.46e-06*** -0.00307***
(2.81e-06) (1.21e-05) (5.89e-06) (0.000820) (3.63e-07) (1.54e-06) (6.93e-07) (0.000598)
Observations 258,433 258,433 258,433 258,433 252,751 252,751 252,751 252,751
Chi(2) 44.70 61.90 28.19 30.55
p 0 0 1.10e-07 2.32e-07
No. uncensored 73074 73074 73074 70544 70544 70544
No. left-censored 185359 185359 185359 182207 182207 182207
Number of firms 37,006 37,006 36,403 36,403
Rho 0.732 0.777 0.518 0.642
Log Likelihood 75070 -101061 185312 -114443
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: See Tables 2 and 3 for variables definition. Variables are scaled by turnover in the upstream market specifications and by total assets
in the downstream market specifications. All specifications control for time effects. The table reports marginal effects and standard errors
(robust standard errors in columns 1 and 4) in parentheses. Columns 2 and 6 report parameter estimates using the two-step Newey estimator.
Chi(2) and p represent the χ
2 statistic and the corresponding probability for the exogeneity tests in columns 1, 2, 5, and 6. In the panel
estimations (columns 3, 4, 7 and 8), the variables Stocks, BankLoans and Liquidity are replaced by their first lags. The table also reports the
number of uncensored and left-censored observations, the number of firms in the panel specifications, Rho, the fraction attributable to the
panel element, and the Log Likelihood.